Introduction
Facebook 1 and other internet-based 2 social networking sites (SNSs) 3 have revolutionised modern communications. 4 Each month more than a billion people actively use Facebook. 5 Facebook activity is global in scope but disproportionately things or express opinions 'that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the population'. 12 The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression has asserted the same approach. 13 Article 19(2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) (ICCPR), to which the United Kingdom (UK) is a party, provides:
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
In its practice and jurisprudence the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has had no conceptual difficulty in applying that provision to freedom of expression on the internet. 14 Means of expression are considered to include 'all forms of electronic and internet-based modes of expression'. 15 The HRC recommended that States parties should ensure that legislative and administrative frameworks for the regulation of the mass media are consistent with the provisions of Article 19(3), which provides:
The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; (b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.
Regulatory systems should take into account the differences between the print and broadcast sectors and the internet, while also noting the manner in which the various media converge. 16 Any restrictions on the operation of websites, blogs or any other internet-based, electronic or other such information dissemination system, including systems to support such communication, such as internet service providers or search engines, are only permissible to the extent that they are compatible with Article 19(3). 17 The HRC has considered that journalism is a function shared by a wide range of actors, including bloggers and others who engage in forms of self-publication on the internet or elsewhere.
The Facebook network is mainly reliant on self-policing by its users. Twitter has a free speech policy that means it does not interfere in disputes or restrict what it describes as 'controversial content'. Moreover, the very nature of internet-based communications inevitably poses challenges for legal systems in terms of both applicable law and connection with territorially bounded jurisdictions. 19 There have been an extensive number of legal challenges to internet service providers such as 'Google' and web hosts in attempts to hold them liable for unlawful third-party content that passes through an internet service provider's (ISP) network 20 and to address privacy 21 and data protection concerns 22 relating to the operation of SNSs. 23 There are also increasing regulatory controls relating to child and consumer protection. 24 In the UK and elsewhere the 47 Section 127(1)(a) makes it an offence to send a message using a 'public electronic communications network' if that message is 'grossly offensive or of an indecent, obscene or menacing character'. It can be used as an alternative offence to such crimes, for example, as hate crime (including race, religion, disability, homophobic, sexual orientation and trans-phobic crime), hacking offences, cyber bullying and cyber stalking, amongst others. 48 The offence is committed once the message is sent, irrespective of whether it is received by any intended recipient or anyone else.
A. 'Grossly Offensive'
The test for 'grossly offensive' is whether the message would cause gross offence to those to whom it relates, who need not be the recipients. 49 In Director of Public Prosecutions v Collins 50 the House of Lords considered that it was justifiable under Article 10(2) of the ECHR to prosecute somebody who has used the public telecommunications system to leave racist messages. 51 In July 2012 Daniel Thomas (T), a semi-professional footballer, posted a homophobic message on Twitter. This related to the UK Olympic divers Tom Daley and Peter Waterfield. This became available to his 'followers'. Someone else distributed it more widely. T was arrested and interviewed. The matter was then referred to CPS Wales to consider whether T should be charged with a criminal offence. The case attracted international publicity and in response, Keir Starmer, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), issued a 'Statement on Tom Daley case and social media prosecutions'. 52 The key question addressed was whether the message was so 'grossly offensive' as to be criminal and, if so, whether a prosecution was required in the public interest. The DPP had no doubt that the message posted by T was offensive and would be regarded as such by reasonable members of society. But the critical question was whether it was so 'grossly offensive' that criminal charges should be brought. The distinction was an important one and not easily made. The ECtHR's statement in Handyside that the right to freedom of expression included the right to say things or express opinions that offended people was recalled. 53 Context and circumstances were highly relevant and in this case included that: (a) however misguided, T intended the message to be humorous; (b) however na|« ve, T did not intend the message to go beyond his followers, who were mainly friends and family; (c) T took reasonably swift action to remove the message; (d) T had expressed remorse and was, for a period, suspended by his football club;
54 (e) neither Daley (D) nor Waterfield (W) were the intended recipients of the message and neither knew of its existence until it was brought to their attention following reports in the media; (f) it was, in essence, a one-off offensive Twitter message, not part of a campaign, and not intended to incite others. On a full analysis of the context and circumstances in which this single message was sent, the Prosecutor decided that it was not so grossly offensive that criminal charges needed to be brought. Before reaching a final decision, D and W had been consulted and both indicated that they did not think this case needed a prosecution. 55 The timeliness of the DPP's Statement was quickly highlighted by subsequent cases. In September 2012 the police arrested Neil Swinburne, aged 22 years, over an offensive Facebook tribute page set up following the fatal shooting of two female police officers in Manchester. 56 In October 2012 Matthew Woods, aged 19 years, pleaded guilty to making 'grossly offensive' remarks about a missing five-year-old girl, April Jones, on his Facebook page. He was sentenced to twelve weeks in prison. . 55 The victims in SNS cases will always have the dilemma that prosecution will inevitably give rise to even wider publication of the relevant statements. It is not normal to consult victims on whether individual defendants should be prosecuted. The implication of the statement (supra n 52) seems to be that the victims' views went to the question of whether it was in the public interest to prosecute, rather than whether the message was grossly offensive. 
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inevitably raise an Article 10 of the ECHR issue given longstanding jurisprudence that the right to freedom of expression includes the right to say things or express opinions 'that offend, shock or disturb the state or any sector of the population'. 58 'Obscene' messages may pass scrutiny with less difficulty than 'indecent' ones. By contrast it is not too difficult to envisage that a prosecution for sending a message of a 'menacing character' might be ECHR compliant in some circumstances. In Chambers v Director of Public Prosecutions, 59 C, aged 26 years, had sent a message sent on Twitter in January 2010. In it he threatened to blow up an airport that C was due to travel from to meet someone, but which had closed because of weather problems. C was convicted of sending a message of a 'menacing character'. The Crown Court upheld this on the basis that the message was 'menacing per se' and that C was aware that his message was of a menacing character. However, the Divisional Court of the High Court quashed the conviction on the basis that the message was not of a menacing character because it was intended as a joke. 60 Before concluding that a message was criminal on the basis that it represented a menace, its precise terms, and any inferences to be drawn from its precise terms, needed to be examined in the context in and the means by which the message was sent. The offence was not directed to the inconvenience which may be caused by the message. The message did not represent a terrorist threat, or indeed any other form of threat. It was posted on 'Twitter' for widespread reading, a conversation piece for C's followers, drawing attention to himself and his predicament. It was not sent to anyone at the airport or anyone responsible for airport security, or indeed any form of public security. The grievance addressed by the message was that the airport was closed when C wanted it to be open. The language and punctuation were inconsistent with C intending it to be or to be taken as a serious warning. Moreover, it was unusual for a threat of a terrorist nature to invite the person making it to be readily identified, as this message did. It was difficult to imagine a serious threat in which warning of it is given to a large number of tweet 'followers' in ample time for the threat to be reported and extinguished. 61 Significantly, the Divisional Court upheld the Crown Court ruling that although Twitter was a private company, the . 61 Chambers v DPP, supra n 59 at para 31. Although C's appeal was successful he was sacked from his job and banned from the airport concerned for life.
messages were processed through the internet and the internet was inherently a 'public electronic communications network'.
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C. The DPP's Interim Guidelines
The DPP's Statement on social media prosecutions noted that the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) was considering a growing number of cases involving the use of social media and that there were likely to be many more. It observed that the context in which this interactive social media dialogue took place was quite different to the context in which other communications took place and that the task for the CPS involved 'balancing the fundamental right of free speech and the need to prosecute serious wrongdoing on a case by case basis'. 63 That often involved very difficult judgment calls and, in the largely unchartered territory of social media, the CPS was proceeding on a case-by-case basis. In some cases it was clear that a criminal prosecution was the appropriate response to conduct that was complained about. For example, where there was a sustained campaign of harassment of an individual, where court orders were flouted or where grossly offensive or threatening remarks were made and maintained. But in many other cases a criminal prosecution would not be the appropriate response. If the fundamental right to free speech was to be respected, the threshold for criminal prosecution had to be a high one and a prosecution had to be required in the public interest. 64 The DPP also announced that he intended, after consultation, to issue guidelines on social media cases for prosecutors. More generally though he suggested that social media was a new and emerging phenomenon that raised difficult issues of principle. The 'time has come for an informed debate about the boundaries of free speech in an age of social media'. towards ensuring compliance with Article 10 of the ECHR. They distinguished between two categories of cases. The first included communications that constituted credible threats of violence to persons or damage to property (this would include menacing communications), which specifically targeted one or more individuals and those which might amount to breach of a court order. All of these were to be prosecuted robustly. 68 In the second category were those which may be considered grossly offensive, indecent, obscene or false. These cases 'will be subject to a high threshold and in many cases a prosecution is unlikely to be in the public interest'. 69 The rationale for this was the potential for a 'chilling effect' of prosecutions for social media communications on free speech. 70 With respect to the high threshold it was stressed that the criminal law provisions had to be interpreted consistently with the free speech principles in Article 10 of the ECHR as interpreted by the ECtHR. It was suggested that the common law took a similar approach. The requirement that a communication be 'grossly' offensive was highlighted as was the importance of context. Prosecutors should have regard to the fact that the context in which interactive social media dialogue takes place was quite different to the context in which other communications take place: ' Access is ubiquitous and instantaneous. Banter, jokes and offensive comments are commonplace and often spontaneous. Communications intended for a few may reach millions.' where they were satisfied that the communication in question was 'more than offensive, shocking or disturbing; or satirical, iconoclastic or rude comment; or the expression of unpopular or unfashionable opinion about serious or trivial matters, or banter or humour, even if distasteful to some or painful to those subjected to it'. 73 Even if so satisfied, prosecutors should go on to consider whether a prosecution was required in the public interest. As both provisions engaged Article 10 of the ECHR no prosecution should be brought unless it could be shown on its own facts and merits to be both necessary and proportionate. A prosecution was unlikely to be both necessary and proportionate where the suspect had swiftly taken action to remove the communication or expressed genuine remorse; swift and effective action had been taken by others, for example, service providers, to remove the communication in question or otherwise block access to it; the communication was not intended for a wide audience, nor was that the obvious consequence of sending the communication; particularly where the intended audience did not include the victim or target of the communication in question; or the content of the communication did not obviously go beyond what could conceivably be tolerable or acceptable in an open and diverse society which upholds and respects freedom of expression. 74 The age and maturity of suspects should be given significant weight, particularly if they were under the age of 18 years. Children may not appreciate the potential harm and seriousness of their communications and a prosecution was rarely likely to be in the public interest.
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D. Lessons from Criminal Jurisprudence
In terms of criminal law one cannot but admire the common sense approach of the DPP and the Interim Guidelines in relation to social media cases and his call for an 'informed debate about the boundaries of free speech in an age of social media'. 76 It is clear that consideration of all of the factors in the Interim Guidelines, particularly the idea of a high threshold and the strong indications of where there is unlikely to be a public interest in prosecuting, will assist in ensuring that any prosecutions are consistent with Article 10 of the ECHR and Article 19 of the ICCPR. Such sensible and detailed prosecutorial guidance may mitigate dated legislation whose application could otherwise be incompatible with human rights standards. 77 However, the rise in prosecutions and the astonishing growth in the quantity of SNSs would suggest that the relevant statutory provisions need to be thoroughly modernised to ensure their compatibility with international human rights standards. The prosecution in Chambers 78 in particular suggests that relying on the exercise of good sense carries unacceptable risks in human rights terms. Laws that clearly interfere with rights to privacy and freedom of expression, including religious views, need to be accessible and foreseeable so that individuals can know and understand, or at least get advice on, the risks they run. 79 The debate needs to be informed by a proper understanding of the massive sociological and societal effects of SNSs. The informed debate may well reveal that there is simply much greater societal acceptance of quite a high level of offensive content on SNSs. 80 At least those who actually engage in Facebook activity may have to meet the argument that there might be a deemed element of knowledge or acceptance of exposure to a high threshold of offensiveness. 81 If so, the law needs to reflect this.
Civil Actions
A. Defamation, Privacy, Discrimination and Harassment
In the UK, publication on the internet in general, 82 and on SNSs 83 in particular, can constitute defamation 84 or breach informational privacy rights 85 protected by Article 8 of the ECHR, 86 or constitute unlawful discrimination or harassment. 87 Two or more sets of postings on a SNS may be considered to be one continuous act up until the last posting occurred and so the of limitation period may run from the time of the last posting. 88 In the aftermath of a story on BBC's Newsnight in 2012, thousands of people wrote or re-tweeted a false accusation that Lord M was a child abuser. The allegation was based on a mistaken identity. The BBC settled the defamation claim in relation to Newsnight for some »185,000, 89 but Lord M threatened legal action against those who had tweeted the allegation. In February 2013 the threat of legal action against those with fewer than five hundred Twitter followers was dropped in return for a modest charitable donation to Children in Need. People with more than five hundred Twitter followers who tweeted the peer's name, including Sally Bercow, the wife of the Speaker of the House of Commons, and George Monbiot, a columnist for The Guardian newspaper, face individual action. Bercow apologised but argued that her tweet was foolish rather than libelous. She is now the focus of legal action. Monbiot apologised unreservedly. The Guardian newspaper would not pay Monbiot's legal costs as he was not a member of its staff and was tweeting in a personal capacity.
(i) Employee cases
A small but growing number of cases in the UK have concerned disciplinary action taken by an employer against an employee because of comments posted on Facebook. In Preece v J.D.Wetherspoon Plc, 90 P, who worked in a pub, was fairly dismissed for offensive comments that she posted on Facebook concerning customers. Although P did not mention the workplace by name, the comments she made were clearly in relation to her work. In 
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working three out of four weekends' recording his dissatisfaction at proposed workplace changes. S realised that the page breached the company's policy and quickly took it down. The page was considered not to be grossly offensive. S fully acknowledged that he should not have done what he did and gave a full apology saying in mitigation that he had been off ill with stress and his judgment had been clouded. S also confirmed during the internal disciplinary process that it would never happen again. The Tribunal held S had been unfairly dismissed. In Whitham v Club 24 Ltd (t/a Ventura), 92 W, who worked for a company that provided customer services for Volkswagen, was unfairly dismissed for misconduct after posting comments about her workplace on Facebook. Her comments were visible to her Facebook friends including colleagues but not to the general public. The comments were relatively mild, were not about Volkswagen as such and did not involve any confidential information. Moreover, it was considered to be highly unlikely that such mild comments by a junior employee could jeopardize the commercial relationship between her company and Volkswagen. The dismissal was held to fall outside the band of reasonable responses. Similar cases can be found in other jurisdictions including Ireland, 93 Canada, 94 the United States 95 and France. 96 It would appear that an employee who is unrepentant in his or her belief that his or her behaviour was not misconduct may lead the employer to the reasonable conclusion that the same thing might happen again in future. However, if an employee recognises that his or her actions were wrong and confirms that there will be no repetition, the employer will find it harder to dismiss him or her fairly. The growing number of cases highlights the importance for employers of having clear policies regarding the use of SNSs at work 97 and outside of work and then following their proper investigatory and disciplinary procedures. It is clear that that even if the comments are made outside of work and in the employee's own time they can be relied upon by employers and used to fairly dismiss. In Teggart v TeleTech UK Limited, 98 TeleTech UK Limited employed T as a customer service representative at its Belfast call centre. He posted an obscene comment on his Facebook page from home about the promiscuity of a female colleague. The comment included reference to TeleTech and was read by Facebook friends including work colleagues but not the female colleague mentioned. The woman subsequently heard about it and told T's girlfriend to ask him to remove it. This request offended T who then posted further obscene comments about her on his Facebook page. After a disciplinary hearing TeleTech concluded that T's conduct amounted to gross misconduct and that he had brought the company into disrepute. T was dismissed. T argued his comments were meant to be a joke and that he regularly mocked people on Facebook. He had also not intended to harass anyone. He complained, inter alia, that there had been a violation of his human rights under Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the ECHR.
The industrial tribunal dismissed his claim for unfair dismissal and also held, following the approach in X and Y, 99 that his rights under the various articles of the ECHR were not engaged. The disciplinary panel's findings of harassment were considered reasonable as T's Facebook comments satisfied the definition of harassment in TeleTech's dignity at work policy as they were unwanted, violated the woman's dignity and created a degrading and humiliating environment. It also held that harassment could occur where comments were directed to others and did not have to be made directly to the particular victim. The decision to find T guilty of bringing TeleTech into disrepute though was seriously flawed. 100 The disciplinary panel had not dealt with the serious element of this charge. The supposed member of the public had not been interviewed or given a statement and there was little or no evidence that TeleTech had been brought into disrepute. However, the tribunal was satisfied that the disciplinary appeal panel would have decided to dismiss for the harassment charge alone and that this would have been reasonable. 
The tribunal considered that the nature of the comments, their vulgarity and coarseness, the intention to create a vulgar distaste for A, the use of some of the postings as a retaliatory measure against the claimant when she sought to have the comments removed, the behaviour that was implied about A in the comments, the reluctance to withdraw them when it was clear that A had been offended, the dissemination of the comments among fellow employees of both the claimant and A, all added together put the sanction of dismissal for this act of harassment within the band of reasonable responses.
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Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the ECHR were not engaged. T abandoned any Article 8 right to consider that his comments were 'private' comments to his circle of friends when he posted them on his Facebook pages, to which members of the public could have access.
102 'Belief' in Article 9 was 'intended to refer to a philosophy, set of values, principles, or mores to which an individual gives his intellectual assent or which guides his conduct or behaviour'. 103 It did not extend to a belief about the promiscuity of another person. Finally, the right to freedom of expression in Article 10 brought with it the responsibility to exercise that right in a way that was necessary for the protection of the reputation and rights of others. 104 The right did not entitle T to make comments that damaged the reputation or infringed the rights of A. A's reputation had been harmed on the basis of a joke or fun. Furthermore, she had the right not to suffer harassment.
(ii) Smith v Trafford Housing Trust
In UK terms the High Court decision in November 2012 in Smith v Trafford Housing Trust 106 is the most important case to date. It highlighted the human rights dimension of decisions based on material appearing in SNSs. S was employed by Trafford Housing Trust as a housing manager. After reading on his computer a news article on the BBC news website headed 'Gay church ''marriages'' set to get the go-ahead', he posted a link to the BBC article on his Facebook wall page, together with the following comment, under his name: 'an equality too far'. S had over two hundred Facebook friends. Most were fellow 101 Ibid. at para 18. 102 In these kinds of circumstances employees will find it difficult to establish that they have a reasonable expectation of privacy under Article 8 ECHR. Tweets are directed to the world at large and so there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy. See also Crisp v Apple Retail UK ET/1500258/2011, November 2011 (although Article 10 ECHR was engaged by an employee's posts on Twitter, the employer could rely on them to justify disciplinary action to the extent that to do so was proportionate to the potential harm to its reputation). 103 Teggart, supra n 98 at para 19. It cited the statement in Allen, Employment Law and Human Rights, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) at 214 that '[t]he limits to this concept lie in a requirement of a serious ideology, having some cogency and cohesion' . 104 It is implicit in this holding that Article 10 was engaged by T's comments on Facebook. 105 Teggart, supra n 98.
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Christians, forty-five of them were fellow employees. Most of S's entries concerned sport, food, motorcycles and cars. His Facebook profile identified his employer and his job title.
107 Miss S, a colleague of S's, posted a comment on S's Facebook wall asking him if this meant he did not approve. S replied as follows:
[N]o not really, I don't understand why people who have no faith and don't believe in Christ would want to get hitched in church. The bible is quite specific that marriage is for men and women.
[I]f the state wants to offer civil marriage to same sex then that is up to the state; but the state shouldn't impose its rules on places of faith and conscience.
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For his two comments S was suspended. Disciplinary proceedings concluded that he had been guilty of gross misconduct for which he deserved to be dismissed. Only on the basis of his long record of loyal service was he demoted to a non-managerial position with a forty per cent reduction in pay. M sought damages for breach of contract. He did not commence proceedings for unfair dismissal in the Employment Tribunal, and did not claim to have been dismissed at all. Although Judge Briggs accepted that S's rights to freedom of expression and to manifest his religious beliefs (S was a Christian) 109 were undoubtedly relevant in the context of the interpretation of his employment contract with the Trust, he considered this was not a case in which his Convention rights were sought to be enforced directly, since the Trust, a private housing trust was not a public authority for the purposes of Section 6 of the HRA 1998.
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For the Judge the first two critical questions concerned (i) the application of the Trust's Code of Conduct and Equal Opportunities Policy to S's use of his Facebook account, and (ii) whether, if applicable, the code of conduct or the policy were contravened by S making the two postings. Context was considered vital to an understanding and determination of these issues.
111 Judge Briggs analysed the Trust's case under three parts. S's postings were 'activities which may bring the Trust into disrepute' contrary to the Code of Conduct Judge Briggs accepted that the Trust was entitled, after the event, to form its own view as to whether particular actions of an employee did or did not constitute misconduct, rather than to have to specify every possible aspect of prohibited conduct in advance, in detail. However, a code or a policy had to be interpreted as a whole, and particular forms of behaviour might constitute misconduct even though not precisely specified and prohibited. Nonetheless codes and policies which formed part of a contractual framework (in the sense that the employee was required to observe and abide by them) had to be objectively construed, by reference to what a reasonable person with the knowledge and understanding of an employee of the type in question would understand by the language used. If an employee was liable to be demoted and to have his salary substantially reduced as a result of misconduct, he must be entitled to ascertain from the codes and policies to which he is subjected what he was and was not permitted to do, and to understand the extent to which those obligations extended beyond the workplace into his personal or social life.
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The Trust argued that by identifying himself in the abbreviated CV under his name on his Facebook wall as a manager of the Trust, S thereby created a real risk that readers of his two postings about gay marriage in church would think that he was expressing views on the Trust's behalf. This would undermine the Trust's sensible determination to maintain neutrality on contentious matters of religious belief and politics. The Judge rejected this argument. He found that S's postings about gay marriage in church were not such as did, or even could, bring the Trust into disrepute. 113 The critical factors were that no reasonable reader of S's Facebook wall page could rationally conclude that his two postings about gay marriage in church were made in any relevant sense on the Trust's behalf. S's brief mention at the top of the page that he was employed as a manager by the Trust (as part of a note from his CV which also identified his school, his place of residence, his marital status and his date of birth) could not possibly lead a reasonable reader to think that his wall page consisted of, or even included, statements made on his employer's behalf. A brief mention of the identity of his employer was in no way inconsistent with the general impression to be gained from his Facebook wall, that it was a medium for personal or social, rather than work-related, information and views. Viewing the entries on S's wall for the period in question as a whole, it was obvious, and would have been obvious even to a casual reader, that he used Facebook for personal and social rather than work-related purposes. The gay marriage postings would have appeared automatically on the newsfeed pages of S's Facebook friends. They would be divorced from the context of the contemporaneous postings about sport, food and motor vehicles, but also from S's reference at the top of his wall page to being a manager at the Trust. In that context there would be no basis for the reader to make any connection between the postings and the Trust.
The Trust also argued the expression of views by a manager that could cause distress to other employees or even customers could of itself bring the Trust into disrepute, even if those persons did not believe that S was in any sense speaking on the Trust's behalf. In support of the Trust's view it referred to the risk that the Trust might lose its recently won accreditation from the Albert Kennedy organisation (which supports lesbian, gay, bisexual and trans young people), the implication being that for the Trust to employ as a manager a person with S's views would undermine its reputation for the encouragement and support of equal treatment of gay and lesbian people. This argument was also rejected. The Judge could not envisage how any such loss of reputation would arise in the mind of any reasonable reader of S's postings, whether in the Albert Kennedy organisation or otherwise. 114 The Trust prided itself on encouraging diversity both among its customers and its employees, and that encouragement of diversity formed part of its well-deserved reputation. But the encouragement of diversity in the recruitment of employees inevitably involved employing persons with widely different religious and political beliefs and views, some of which, however moderately expressed, might cause distress among the holders of deeply felt opposite views. On the assumption that S was not reasonably to be taken as seeking to express the Trust's own views, his moderate expression of his particular views about gay marriage in church, on his personal Facebook wall at a weekend out of working hours, could not sensibly lead any reasonable reader to think the worst of the Trust for having employed him as a manager.
Whether S was by his postings promoting his religious views contrary to that part of the Code of Conduct dealing with relationships with customers, members of the public and colleagues
The Judge referred to the relevant passage in the Code of Conduct stating that 'The Trust is a non-political, non-denominational organisation and employees should not attempt to promote their political or religious views.' Neither of S's comments could sensibly be described as 'promotion'. The question raised was the extent to which a reasonable managerial employee would think that this his views upon his work colleagues, in the sense in which a promotional email sent to all their addresses might fairly be regarded. His Facebook wall was primarily a virtual meeting place at which those who knew of him, whether his work colleagues or not, could at their own choice attend to find out what he had to say about a diverse range of non-work-related subjects. Even to the extent that his Facebook wall was accessible to friends of friends, actual access would still depend upon the persons in that wider circle taking the trouble to access it. 118 It made no difference to that analysis that postings on S's wall would appear automatically on the newsfeed pages of his friends' Facebooks.
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The critical difference between a targeted email or inviting his workplace colleagues for a drink at the local pub for the purpose of enabling religious or political promotion outside work and S's Facebook was that it was his colleagues' choice, rather than his, to become his friends, and that it was the mere happenstance of their having become aware of him at work that led them to do so. He was in principle free to express his religious and political views on his Facebook, provided he acted lawfully, and it was for the recipients to choose whether or not to receive them.
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S was failing to treat fellow employees with dignity and respect, including being non-judgmental in approach and that he was engaging in conduct which may make another person feel uncomfortable, embarrassed or upset, contrary to the Equal Opportunities Policy as well as contrary to the Code of Conduct
The Judge reached the conclusion that with respect to this aspect of the Code and the Policy, S's Facebook was also not sufficiently work-related. He stressed the importance of freedom of speech:
The frank but lawful expression of religious or political views may frequently cause a degree of upset, and even offence, to those with deeply held contrary views, even where none is intended by the speaker. This is a necessary price to be paid for freedom of speech. To construe this provision as having application to every situation outside work where an employee comes into contact with one or more work colleagues would be to impose a fetter on the employee's freedom of speech in circumstances beyond those to which a reasonable reader of the Code and Policy would think they applied. 121 The Judge accepted that Facebook could be used, for example, to pass judgment on the morality of a named work colleague, which would contravene this part of the Code and the Policy. 122 Prohibitions upon certain kinds of conduct might be of wider application to managers than to other employees. Nonetheless some objectivity needed to be applied to the analysis of S's postings, even if a 'real risk' test was applied to the prohibition on causing upset. Statements about religion or politics may be more prone to misinterpretation than others, but it could not be considered a reasonable interpretation of those provisions that they should be taken to have been infringed if language which was non-judgmental, not disrespectful nor inherently upsetting nonetheless caused upset merely because it was misinterpreted. 123 S's postings about gay marriage in church were not, viewed objectively, judgmental, disrespectful or liable to cause upset or offence. As to their content, they were widely held views frequently to be heard on radio and television, or read in the newspapers. The question remained whether the manner or language in which S expressed his views about gay marriage in church could fairly or objectively be described as judgmental, disrespectful or liable to cause discomfort, embarrassment or upset. The Judge thought not. He was mainly responding to an enquiry as to his views, and doing so in moderate language. 124 Miss S's interpretation was understandable but not objectively reasonable. Nor was that of another employee who viewed the tone of the postings was offensive. S's postings did not disclose homophobia. 125 (iii) The outcome for Smith
In the result Judge Briggs held that the Trust did not have a right to demote S by reason of his Facebook postings and that the demotion imposed by way of purported disciplinary sanction constituted a breach of contract. 126 The Trust immediately accepted the Court's decision and made a full and sincere apology to S. 127 It might reasonably be suggested that S's comments were mildly formulated, diplomatically expressed and supported the existing state of the law. The Trusts' response was an over-reaction that brought it no credit. Even the leading gay activist Peter Tatchell regarded the Trust's approach as wrong. 128 often central to their social life. Particularly for younger generations, SNSs such as Facebook and Myspace are irreplaceable. 134 A lot of their lives are lived online and to be outside SNSs carries a price of social exclusion and non-identity. Notions of choice in this context are increasingly rhetorical. For some SNSs, such as Facebook, there are stronger elements of actual consent in terms of the acceptance of friends. 135 But this breaks down as persons other than friends can access information indirectly. For other SNSs, such as Twitter, the consensual argument is much weaker. The sender has no control over who accesses the communications.
It is a commonplace that the law necessarily struggles to keep up with speed with which technology develops. The rapid evolution of SNSs certainly demands imaginative and informed re-thinking about their legal regulation. 136 In legal terms communicating via SNSs is clearly not the equivalent of oral conversations with friends 137 in a cafe, a bar or a public house. 138 There is a permanent written record. 139 There is also a potentially much wider audience, particularly given ability of search engines to give exponential and long-lasting publicity to a comment on an SNS and the use of automated programmes that 'mine' publicly available data on SNSs. Technology has changed the way individuals communicate and engage in public discourse. 140 SNSs may represent the modern equivalent of what had previously been considered to occupy private, familial, close community or domestic spaces where the law tended not to go because it adopts a 'give and take' approach. 141 Notwithstanding Facebooks' terms of service that individuals have to use their real names, it is a fact that some users do not. 142 The SNS persona, whether real or imagined, is part of the individual's persona. Essentially the argument is that the 'mass adoption of Facebook changes privacy, and thus how users understand and deal with privacy concerns'. 143 For one of the inventors of Facebook there needed to be recognition that privacy was no longer a 'social norm' and had evolved over time. 144 In SNS spaces distinguishing between what is offensive and what is an acceptable, but shockingly expressed, argument is difficult.
More generally, legal regulation of SNSs is challenging because it doesn't fit with the paradigms on which laws relating to freedom of expression have been built. The line between individual and small group communications on one side and mass communication on the other is gradually fading. So too is the line between individual communications and those by organisations and institutions. 145 It is not really credible to apply the high standards of journalism and broadcasting imposed by human rights law on mass communication organisation and institutions to individuals. 146 The law will have to adapt. This will have to happen both in terms of substantive law and remedies that afford effective legal protection. 147 An example with respect to the latter is the UK Defamation Bill 2012, which provides for increased protection to operators of websites that host user-generated content, providing they comply with a procedure to enable the complainant to resolve disputes directly with the author of the material concerned. 148 Another idea in remedies terms might be that, instead of damages, a court or tribunal could order the same SNS account (for example, Facebook or Twitter) that carried the message or communication which contravenes the law to have to carry the appropriate apology or explanation in the same way that mass media sometimes provides apologies or clarifications to the same audience. Assuming it is technically possible, that could go some way to ensuring that whoever received the offending or defamatory message also received the follow up communication and did so from the individual responsible. This might well exert a degree of informal control in that the individual is revealed to their friends or followers as legally wrong. In some cases they will also be exposed as foolish and irresponsible. If SNSs are so 'irreplaceable' 149 in people's lives this remedy will not discourage their continued use but might affect a practicable degree of civilisation and responsibility in controlling an 'element of mob rule'. 150 
